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CRIMES AGAINST AUTONOMY: GERALD DWORKIN ON
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY
LAWRENCE

C. BECKER*

INTRODUCTION

My aim here is to redescribe some familiar ground, in aid of
the idea that a principle of equal protection of individual autonomy is fundamental to decisions about which moral norms ought
to be enforced through the criminal law. It seems necessary to
do this, because when a distinguished philosopher such as Gerald Dworkin gives us an unsettling essay on a familiar topic, the
source of the disturbance is not likely to be internal to the essay
itself, at least not in any obvious way. It is more likely that the
problem is in the background. My aim is to illuminate this background. The substance will not be new, but my hope is that the
way this Essay brings it into focus will help to rehabilitate the
idea that Professor Dworkin attacks.
The aim of this redescription is restricted in several ways,
however. First, it is part of an explication of liberal politicaltheory rather than an argument that follows from some comprehensive account of morality. My aim will be to show that liberal political theorists plausibly invoke autonomy' to explain why they
draw the line about criminalization where they do. I leave aside
here whether, and if so how, liberal political principles and polity
* William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor in the Humanities (Philosophy), College of
William and Mary.
1. For convenience, I will use the summary definition of autonomy given by Professor Dworldn himself in The Theory and Practice of Autonomy:
[Alutonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect
critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth
and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higherorder preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take
responsibility for the kind of person they are.
GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988).
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are justified by a comprehensive moral theory. Second, on the
assumption that we live in an imperfect liberal democracy, a
complex relation will exist between my thesis about autonomy
and the actual boundary, in our legal system, between the criminal and the noncriminal. On the one hand, descriptive accuracy
will be a test of the autonomy thesis: if it turns out that a proposed principle of autonomy draws a boundary that is radically
different from the actual one, the plausibility of the thesis will
be in doubt. On the other hand, we must not expect a perfect
match between what liberal theory prescribes and what liberal
practice in a complex political environment is able to deliver.
Rather, we should expect to find and be able to accommodate
some inconsistencies and anomalies. Third, the principle I will
defend is only a necessary condition for criminal enforcement,
not a sufficient one. It thus gives us a good guide to decisions
about what must be excluded from the criminal sphere (in liberal theory), but it is not by itself a good guide to decisions about
what must be, or should be, included. For the decision about
inclusion, there is no substitute for an appeal to consequences.
I. MORAL NORMS AND NUCLEAR ENFORCEMENT:
THE GENERAL PICTURE

Here is a familiar picture: the norms of morality may be represented as points on a plane. Some of these points (color them
red, for convenience) indicate requirements and prohibitions;
others indicate judgments about what we "ought" to do that
nonetheless fall short of requirements or prohibitions (color
them yellow, for cautions); still others indicate conduct in which
our choices are matters of moral indifference (color them
green)-points at -which we are permitted to do just as we
please.
It is clear that it is logically possible to arrange these red,
yellow, and green points on the normative plane in a variety of
interesting ways, ranging from something like an exercise in
pointilist painting to drawings in a cell biology textbook. The
standard way of representing the normative plane, however, is
to group the points in each of the normative categories together
into a series of concentric figures. On the assumption-or per-

1999]

CRIMES AGAINST AUTONOMY

961

haps a desperate hope-that the least restrictive norms are the
most numerous, we typically imagine the green ones-permissions-as being in the largest, outermost figure, perhaps even in
an unbounded field. This large green field surrounds the set of
nonmandatory "oughts," which in turn surrounds requirements
and prohibitions. Moreover, we can represent the fact that the
norms of each sort are enforced in more or less strict ways by
shading these concentric figures so that the color of each becomes more intense, or darker, toward its center. Then, on the
assumption that criminal sanctions are the most severe, and
reserved for the most important norms of the most restrictive
sort, we have what I call a nuclear picture of the enforcement of
morals problem: we think of criminal law as properly enforcing
only a small nucleus of the most significant moral requirements
and prohibitions.
Wittgenstein has cautioned us not to be captured, in doing
philosophy, by pictures that we have not studied carefully from
outside their frames, as it were.2 In the case of the standard picture of the normative plane, this is very good advice. For one
thing, it follows immediately from the standard picture that
Hart's answer to the enforcement of morals question he considers is necessarily and trivially correct: It cannot follow merely
from the fact that something is a moral norm somewhere on the
normative plane that it belongs in the nucleus of norms that
properly are subject to criminal sanctions.' In the standard picture, merely being a moral norm of some sort is neither necessary nor sufficient for criminal sanctions, and being a mandatory moral norm, while a necessary condition, is not a sufficient
one. The norm must be a nuclear one. We therefore need some
account of what. makes a norm a nuclear one, and in a liberal
political polity it is natural to think that this account would
have to be given in terms of the core principles of the theory,
namely autonomy and liberty.
Of course it will be possible, within the standard picture of
concentric figures on the normative plane, to propose a very
restrictive definition of morality-one, for example, that defines
2. See LUDWIG WrITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 34, 193 (1953).
3. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 4-5 (1963).
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matters of moral concern as involving only the most significant
sorts of requirements and prohibitions. This will make it true
by definition-or at any rate, thinkable-that moral status
might be sufficient to justify criminal enforcement of a given
norm. Such a restrictive definition of morality would, for example, place eudaemonistic and perfectionistic considerations in a
larger-or perhaps wholly separate-category of the "ethical"
and would reserve large areas of the plane for nonmoral and
even nonethical norms.
One of the things I want to suggest, though I will not take
time to develop it, is that unacknowledged differences about the
concept of a moral norm often generate differences about whether moral norms should be enforced criminally. If one wishes to
reserve the term "noral" for the most important region of the
most restrictive class of norms on the normative plane, then I
suppose it is plausible that he might think that all moral norms
are at least candidates for such criminal sanctions. If one takes
a more traditional, wider view of moral norms, however, it will
seem preposterous to think that mere moral status makes them
candidates for criminal law enforcement.
It seems to me that this conceptual difference to some extent
explains the debates between Mill4 and Fitzjames Stephen 5 and
between Hart6 and Devlin.7 Both Devlin and his predecessor believe that matters of moral concern are right at the core-in the
nucleus-of our normative concerns and are therefore, of course,
always candidates for the most serious type of enforcement we
can devise-typically, criminal enforcement! Both Hart and his
predecessor, however, have it in mind that morality encompasses ideals as well as duties, permissions as well as requirements,
matters that seriously affect great numbers of people as well as
matters of rather transient, local importance.9 To them it seems

4. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LMERTY 13 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts
Press 1956) (1859).
5. See JAMEs FITzJAMEs STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 135 (R.J.

White ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1873).
6. See HART, supra note 3, at 4-5.
7. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13 (1965).
8. See id. at 24-25; STEPHEN, supra note 5, at 143.

9. See HART, supra note 3, at 70-74; MILL, supra note 4, at 12-13.
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obvious that making a case for the criminal enforcement of a
moral norm requires something more than merely acknowledging that it is a moral norm. The debate between the two sides
continues partly because this conceptual difference is largely
ignored and partly because each side is eager to address the central issue raised in Professor Dworkin's essay-the issue of
whether there is a principled line that can be drawn around the
class of norms that are fit for criminal enforcement.
II. AUTONOMY IS THE THEORY; LIBERTY IS THE PRACTICE
What are the candidates for a "principled line" here? Professor
Dworkin's argument addressed the possibility of drawing a line
in terms of "the protection of autonomy and equal respect for
persons."" I agree with him that this is a good candidate to examine, but before doing so it is useful to retreat a moment to
consider the general nature of criminal law.
Criminal law has several notable features. First and foremost,
it is an area of public law in which (roughly speaking) the initiative for prosecution resides with the state, and the sanctions it
imposes on wrongdoers are designed predominantly to satisfy
public purposes rather than to compensate or satisfy individual
victims. Second, criminal penalties at their worst typically involve thoroughgoing forfeiture of fundamental liberties, confiscation of property, or even in some cases the taking of life itself.
Civil sanctions at their worst never intentionally take life itself,
and when they take fundamental liberties-such as freedom of
movement, speech, or custodianship of one's children-they typically are quite limited in extent and leave intact not only most
of the individual's sum total of liberty, but most of the very liberty that the sanctions restrict. Third, criminal penalties at their
worst stigmatize the wrongdoer in a way that civil sanctions do
not. When we convict someone of a crime we are, in the paradigmatic case, branding the convict as someone who has violated
the social contract, or who has demonstrated that he is a threat
to people generally or to fundamental social institutions-in

10. Gerald Dworkin, Devlin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 927, 931 (1999).
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addition to being someone who has violated a person's rights, or
who has in some other way harmed individuals.
What makes this all very messy, of course, is that all three of
these features are matters of degree and that some criminal
penalties lack one or more of these features altogether. The stigma, for example, is often minimal or lacking altogether for tax
offenses in our culture, and criminal penalties that involve only
fines may, depending on their scale, impose little or no significant loss of liberty or property. Moreover, as a practical matter,
the state will not pursue many minor crimes in the absence of a
formal complaint by the victim, and in some cases restitution to
the victim is a prominent part of the criminal penalty. Now add
to that some facts about civil actions: that the state can be a
party to civil actions; that civil sanctions can involve purely punitive damages; that some civil actions (such as sexual harassment cases) are stigmatizing; that class action suits are
sometimes undertaken for the public good without the knowledge or consent of most of the victims affected; and that some
civil damage awards can be confiscatory. All of this makes it
very difficult to draw up a set of necessary and sufficient defining conditions that will cleanly and clearly separate the criminal
from the civil sphere in anything other than a purely formal or
nominal sense.
It seems to me, then, that if we were looking for a principled
line that adequately describes the actual boundary in our system
between the criminal and the civil, we would be doomed to fail.
Principles may underwrite the distinction between the central,
paradigmatic features of criminal law and the central, paradigmatic features of civil law. When it comes to defining the actual
boundary between criminal and civil law, however, it seems safe
to say that political power, administrative efficiency, and historical accident have been more influential than the deliberate
application of a moral principle. Moreover, the odds of finding
that the results of this messy process just happen to correspond
neatly to the line that one would draw by the deliberate application of moral principles seem very long indeed.
For these reasons, if we are going to undertake the hunt for a
principled line, perhaps we should consider only the central,
paradigmatic cases-that is, the area of law in which all three
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core features of criminal law are clearly present and clearly distinct in either degree or kind from anything found in civil law.
Our question then becomes whether there is a principled line
that marks off this area of the criminal law-the area where the
sanctions are deeply stigmatizing, involve serious restrictions on
individual liberty, and are defined and administered to serve the
purposes of public rather than private law.
Can a principle of "autonomy and equal respect" mark off this
area of the law? In liberal political theory, it seems to be the appropriate candidate. Protecting individual liberty is by definition
a central concern for any liberal polity, but the reason liberals
insist on a polity that protects life, liberty, property, and the
pursuit of happiness is that liberal political theory valorizes the
powers of autonomous agency and ascribes the capacity for such
autonomous agency, in equal measure, to all mature, healthy
human beings.' Implementing that value requires the most extensive possible protections for the development, maintenance,
and exercise of the capacity for autonomous agency consistent
with equal protection for all. Restrictions on liberty-restrictions
on the ways in which individuals exercise their autonomy-will
always require justification, but restrictions which compromise
the capacity for autonomous activity itself (as opposed to its
mere exercise in a particular case) will require the strongest
possible justification.
This distinction often gets lost in political debates about liberty, especially when libertarianism is conceived of as a variety of
liberal political theory. Libertarians who conceive of liberty as
intrinsically valuable, and thus conceive of the protection of liberty as a fundamental moral principle, are not liberals. Perhaps,
rather, it is best to say that they are at one end of a continuum
which includes liberals for whom the fundamental moral principle is the protection of autonomy. For those liberals, the protection of liberty is an instrumental principle, adopted as a way of
implementing a commitment to the development, maintenance,
and exercise of agency powers in everyone. Such liberals will
accept restrictions on liberty that are necessary to develop or

11. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 4; JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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preserve agency powers; that is, the basic liberal argument for
paternalistic intervention. Such liberals will be relatively untroubled by restrictions on liberty that leave "as much and as
good" for the agents involved-that is, satisfy a general version
of the Lockean Proviso 2 -or that are the inevitable by-product
of autonomous choices by the agents themselves and do no harm
to others (e.g., Mill's harm principle 3 ). The fact that Professor
Dworkin writes a skeptical essay about autonomy and the enforcement of morals, though it limits my liberty in some sense, does
not limit it in a morally or politically significant sense.
All of this is fairly standard and I need not belabor it here.
Let us instead proceed, then, to outlining an argument for using
a commitment to autonomy to draw a principled line that marks
off the norms that properly are subject to criminal sanctions.
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR DRAWING THE LINE WITH AUTONOMY
Suppose that autonomy is something of incomparable value
for human beings, that our autonomy is the thing most precious
to us and is the basis for human dignity, respect for person, and
moral worth. The argument for such a proposition is of course
likely to be a long one, especially if it is given in German. I, myself, prefer the ones given in Greek and Latin by the Stoics. For
the sake of argument, however, suppose we accept the belief
about autonomy that it is an incomparable, unique, and superlative good.1 4 The immediate inference from this is that we cannot

12. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967). Robert Nozick gave the principle its felicitous name. See
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 178-82 (1974). For additional discussion of the principle and of Nozicek's treatment of it, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER,
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 32-40 (1977), and Lawrence C. Becker,
Property Rights and Social Welfare, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES 71, 71 n.4, 75 n.12 (Kenneth Kipnis & Diana T. Meyers
eds., 1985).
13. See MILL, supra note 4, at 13, 91-93.
14. Professor Dworkin himself rejects such a claim:
There is an intellectual error that threatens to arise whenever autonomy has been defended as crucial or fundamental: This is that the notion is elevated to a higher status than it deserves. Autonomy is important, but so is the capacity for sympathetic identification with others, or
the capacity to reason prudentially, or the virtue of integrity. Similarly,
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then try to "balance" autonomy against other goods, because its
value is incommensurable to theirs. By hypothesis, the value of
autonomy is uniquely greater than that of other things, therefore it naturally would assume a very special place in our hierarchy of preferences-it would have lexical priority, to use
Rawlsian jargon.15 Seeking, cultivating, and protecting autonomy
would have priority for us because autonomy would be uniquely,
superlatively good; we would not compromise that good in pursuit of others because we could not compare its value, for us, to
the value of other goods. This gives us the principle, by
contraposition, that the only admissible justifications for limiting autonomy in a given case will have to do with what is necessary for seeking, cultivating, or protecting autonomy in other
cases. To put this in more familiar terms, we might say that the
only reason for which we legitimately may limit the autonomous
activity of one person is in order to seek, cultivate, or protect the
autonomous activity of that person or others. It is natural to
suppose that this limitation principle is implicitly proportional,
that the justification for limiting one's autonomy will require
showing that the limitation is necessary for seeking, cultivating,
or protecting an equal or greater amount of autonomy in that
person or in others. Finally, then, on the assumption that in the
central, paradigmatic cases, criminal sanctions always limit the
autonomy of the person on whom they are imposed-and limit
it in the most severe way that we can devise-we conclude that
such sanctions are only appropriate in defense of autonomy
itself.

although it is important to respect the autonomy of others, it is also important to respect their welfare, or their liberty, or their rationality. Theories that base everything on any single aspect of human personality, on
any one of a number of values, always tend toward the intellectually imperialistic. One way in which this is done is by assimilating other concepts to that of autonomy. I have tried to avoid this by sharply distinguishing autonomy from other concepts. But having done this there is
the tendency to claim that the concept is not only distinct but also supreme. I believe that autonomy is both important normatively and fundamental conceptually. Neither of these precludes the possibility that other
concepts are both important and fundamental.
DWORKEn, supra note 1, at 32.
15. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 244.
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This is a very familiar form of argument-more familiar, probably, to Professor Dworkin because of his important work on autonomy." Why, then, is he so skeptical about using this argument to draw a principled line around the class of acts that legitimately may be criminalized? Evidently, one thing about
which he is skeptical is the assumption in the final step of the
argument that criminal sanctions are the most severe type that
we can devise, in terms of their consequences for autonomy.17 He
also evidently thinks that existing accounts of the matter from
liberals do not establish adequately-or perhaps do not even
give plausible arguments for-the unique value and lexical priority premises in the argument.18 He has an even more general
source for his skepticism in the thought that some sort of license
to enforce is implicit in the very concept of a moral norm, and
that whether or not the enforcement should be by way of the
criminal law is a question that is to be answered, ultimately, by
consequentialist considerations rather than by applying some
deontological principle. 9 These are formidable challenges.
Notice first that the form of this argument is more general
than my brief sketch may imply. I began with a very strong
premise about the value of autonomy, which led to a very strong
premise about its priority in our hierarchy of preferences and
then to a very restrictive premise about the conditions under
which autonomy could be limited. We need not suppose, however, that liberals like Mill, Hart, or Joel Feinberg would have to
sign onto anything quite this Stoic or Kantian to make a similar
argument. All they would need is a premise about the value of
autonomy (or liberty) that supports the claim that it has some
sort of priority for moral agents-a priority that imposes an unusually heavy burden of proof on anyone who proposes to limit
a person's capacity for autonomy, or the free, harmless exercise
of it, in pursuit of other values. That much, together with the
assumption that paradigmatic criminal sanctions always limit

16. See DWORKIN, supra note 1.
17. See id. at 25-28 (arguing that obeying the law does not necessarily involve a

forfeiture of autonomy).
18. See id at 29-30.
19. See Dworkin, supra note 10, at 939-40.
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autonomy in this way, will be enough to draw a pale, wavy, and
somewhat smudged line of the principled sort Professor Dworkin
is considering.
Next, let us think briefly about whether it is plausible to hold
that autonomy necessarily has some sort of lexical priority for
us. I think it is plausible to hold that classic liberal position, at
least in terms of what counts as a good human life. Consider the
limiting case: a conception of the good life as one of subordination, or the forfeiture of autonomy-to G d, nation, family, or
whatever. It is plausible to think that the value of such a life for
the person involved will come from the perceived righteousness,
nobility, exhilaration, or pleasure of the life so lived-of the sustained, purposive living of a subordinated life. That means preserving the value of such a life will involve the preservation of
autonomy in a very fairly strong form, a form in which one persistently acquiesces to being dominated. To go further than
that-to seek a form of life in which autonomy in even that
sense is extinguished-is to venture into territory in which the
very question of a good life, as something worth pursuing, does
not arise. It seems plausible to think that whatever that form of
life is, it is not anything recognizable as the life of a moral
agent. A fairly strong form of autonomy, then, is a necessary
good for moral agents with respect to what counts, for them, as
a good life.2" Moreover, other candidates for basic or necessary
goods, such as air, water, food, and shelter, are subordinate to
autonomy in this sense: If we are suddenly deprived of those
other basic goods but are still able to act autonomously-however briefly-in many circumstances we are still able to make
good lives for ourselves by resupplying ourselves with those
goods. If, however, we suddenly are deprived of the capacity for
autonomy itself, none of the other basic goods provides us with
an instrument for bootstrapping our way back to autonomy and

20. Dworkin agrees:
There are various connections between autonomy as I
it and metaphysical and attitudinal features of persons.
who we are, of self-identity, of being this person is linked
to find and re-fine oneself. The exercise of the capacity is
life mine.

DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 32.

have conceived
Our notion of
to our capacity
what makes a
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thus to what is necessary for a good life. This seems enough to
support the notion that autonomy is uniquely valuable and that
its preservation should have some sort of lexical priority for us.
Finally, consider what the connection is between the lexical
priority of autonomy and the criminal enforcement of morality.
Considerations of autonomy give us a way of marking off a class
of moral harms that are especially severe, for the reasons just
given. Moreover, the harms in this class are especially appropriate for public law as opposed to private law remedies. Damage
to a person's autonomy typically imposes a burden on us all,
making it an appropriate matter of public, as opposed to merely
private, concern. Such damaged autonomy also typically compromises the ability of the injured person to seek and obtain remedies privately. Further, the autonomy principle is scalar in a
way that maps reasonably well onto the main outlines of the
criminal law. In particular, it overlays the notion that wrongs
should be scaled in terms of the nature of the perpetrator's intent (mens rea) as well as the nature of the harm done to the
victim because, if autonomy is involved, both things are pressing
matters of social concern. It also maps onto the notion that the
consent of the victim, or the victim's voluntary assumption of
risk, may sometimes, but not always, negate the justification for
imposing criminal sanctions.
I am not, therefore, persuaded by the final section of Professor
Dworkin's essay, in which he suggests that there are reasons for
thinking that no principled line can be drawn around a subset of
moral norms marked off for criminal sanctions.21 Ultimately, he
proposes that the notion of enforcement is implicit in the very
concept of a moral norm, and because the actual severity of
sanctions does not correspond to a principled distinction between
criminal law and other sorts of legal enforcement, or even between legal enforcement and informal social enforcement, the
real work that liberals need to do is in deciding what the moral
norms are in the first place. What he evidently means by moral
norms are what I have called requirements and prohibitionsalong with, perhaps, those nonmandatory "oughts" that verge on

21. See Dworkin, supra note 10, at 942-46.

1999]

CRIMES AGAINST AUTONOMY

971

the mandatory and that, like some matters of etiquette, we do
enforce fitfully. What he is arguing is that the honest labor that
liberals need to do is in deciding which of those moral norms
should be enforced criminally. That sounds right to me as far it
goes, but as I have suggested, I think ending the search for a
principled line may be premature.
IV. CASES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Applying this high altitude argument to the dirty details of
human conduct is no simple matter. Thoroughgoing attempts to
do so can easily get bogged down in a swamp of slippery distinctions about what counts as a genuine harm to one's capacity for
autonomous action and what counts as a significant limitation
on the exercise of one's agency powers. The general outlines of
liberal concerns are clear enough: hostility to the death penalty,
and to the use of deadly force generally, as long as other options
are available; lesser hostility to maiming, physical torture, and
terrorism; similar concern about the crippling effects of psychological abuse and psychologically debilitating environments; concern about the social conditions necessary for developing and
sustaining autonomy, which translates into special attention to
child welfare, the oppression of women and minorities, addictive
substances that deform autonomy, and the indirect consequences
of prostitution, informational blackmail, dwarf tossing, pornography, and a host of other practicei; special protection for civil liberties; and a general reluctance to expand the robust, paradigmatic criminal enforcement of morality.
Liberals disagree among themselves about the details. I suggest, however, that some of this disagreement is the result of
attempting to force the principle of autonomy to do too much.
Here I gladly join Professor Dworkin in his skepticism. Even if
we accept the principled line drawn by autonomy, we should
recognize that it only settles matters of an exclusionary sort.
When we can show that a given practice of autonomous adults
poses no threat to the development or protection of autonomy in
others, we have a conclusive reason for rejecting paradigmatic
criminal sanctions against that practice, even if the practice violates other moral norms. That is why some liberals feel justified,
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in debates about the limits of criminal law, in avoiding the honest labor of deciding whether or not homosexuality, for example,
violates moral norms of a nonmandatory sort. It is enough to
have shown that the practice does not cross the line drawn by a
concern for autonomy. Such exclusionary arguments, however,
do not settle arguments about whether merely crossing the line
is ever sufficient to justify criminal sanctions. Moreover, they do
not settle questions about using some weakened form of criminal
law to regulate matters that do not cross the line.
Finally, it is fair to wonder whether my redescription here has
somehow changed the subject; whether there is really any firm
connection between the sort of argument I have outlined and the
great debates about the enforcement of morals between liberals
such as Mill, Hart, Feinberg, and the other Dworkin on one side
and, for lack of a better term, conservatives 'such as Fitzjames
Stephen and Devlin on the other. I think there is a firm connection. I think liberals are in general convinced that there is a special value, and hence a special priority, that must be assigned to
autonomy. Some liberals, like Hart, are ambivalent enough
about this to object to the Rawlsian notion of the lexical priority
of liberty.22 But I take it that by definition, if they are liberals,
they are not as deeply ambivalent about, or as dismissive of, the
priority of autonomy as are the conservatives (like Devlin) who
are preoccupied with defending the social and moral "fabric" of
society. Liberals remain preoccupied with restricting methods of
repairing or reinforcing the social fabric when those methods
compromise autonomy; conservatives are more inclined to take a
stitch in time even if it does compromise autonomy, and to use
whatever mending techniques work best when things start to
come unraveled. It seems to me that this is a persistent difference between liberals and their critics, and the honest labor liberals need to do is to secure each step in the argument I have
outlined: that the value of autonomy is extraordinary; that this
extraordinary value entails an extraordinary priority for autono-

22. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 244 ("By the priority of liberty I mean the precedence of the principle of equal liberty over the second principle of justice. The two
principles are in lexical order, and therefore the claims of liberty are to be satisfied

first.").
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my; that this extraordinary priority entails extraordinary limitations on the ways in which autonomy may be sacrificed for other
values; and that, in general, this means that criminal sanctions
that seriously limit autonomy cannot be imposed to control some
form of immoral behavior simply because that behavior is immoral.

